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RECENT DECISIONS
The courts have long disputed the exact priority between chattel mortgages
and artificer's liens. The majority of decisions rendered concerned automobiles.
62 A.L.R. 1485 (1929). In this case the extent of the mobility of the mortgaged
chattel must be considered against the scope of a recording system which is meant
to cover the entire United States. The artisan knew that the engines belonged
to a corporation of The United States and expected to find any mortgage on
such engines recorded, of necessity, in the Civil Aeronautics Administration files.
The discrepencies of the common law decisions have been eliminated to some
extent in most jurisdictions by statutes stating the exact relation of a prior chattel
mortgage to an artificer's lien. They seem to have attempted generally to hold
the chattel mortgage prior where it has been duly registered and the artisan
placed in a position whereby he is able to know of such mortgage. Notes, 32
A.L.R. 1005 (1924); 88 A.L.R. 1185 (1934). See also 10 Am. Jun. CHATTELIMoaTGAGEs §§ 215-219.
The fundamental rights of property are not violated by the
priority of a lien against a chattel mortgage without consent or such construction
by legislative enactment as makes it unavoidable. See JoNEs, CHEATL MORTGAGES
AND CONDiTIONAL SALES § 474 (6th ed. 1933).
The situation in the principal case is not properly analogous to the similar
cases in admiralty, since it cannot be said that such repairs were immediately necessary because of unexpected emergency. Nor is there any consideration as to the
artificer's lien having priority over a valid government lien, by way of mortgage,
since the government lien is invalid as to third persons. Since this was a mortgage lien for a debt, the United States would be held to the same rules as to
validity and priority of security as applied to any citizen, since such liens are not
likely to cripple the United States in carrying on its sovereign functions.
In summation, it may be said that an artificer's lien may take precedence over
a government lien invalid as to third parties. Since the mortgage did not contain
a sufficiently definite description of the engines to constitute a valid mortgage as
to third persons, the defendant's lien prevailed and the replevin action was dismissed.
The modern growth of highly specialized repair work, occasioned by the everincreasing complexity of our mechanical civilization, has highlighted the need for
comprehensive legislation, already attempted in a few states, to establish definitely
the relationship between the chattel mortgage and the artificer's lien.
Dake A. Winnie
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THE HISTORY, NATuRE AND USE oir Epix=A 3N MoRAL THEOLOGY. A dissertation by the Rev. Lawrence 3. Riley.' Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University Press. 1948.-The first part of this lengthy dissertation is devoted to the
historical aspects of the epikeia problem, while the second part is dedicated to
an investigation of the nature, usefulness and extent of epikeia in moral theology.
The historidal part emphasizes with great skill and understanding the teachings
of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas on this subject in particular. The author
correctly points out that Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, supplemented by a few
passages from the Rhetoric, contain the first detailed explanation of the epikeia
or epi ikeia; and that this authoritative explanation influenced directly or indirectly
nearly all subsequent writers on this subject.
1

Former Secretary of the Tribunal of the Arch Diocese of Boston.
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St. Thomas has pointed out that any law concerned primarily with the
achievement of the common good must "take into account many things, as to
persons, as to matters, and as to thnes."2 "Now it happens often that the observance of some points of law (St. Thomas refers here to the strict positive law)
is conducive to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some
3
Should such a situation arise the strict positive law is
cases, is very hurtful."
not to be enforced, but should be supplanted by epikeia, that is "equitable justice." Thus epikeid becomes a vital part of justice, or to be more exact, of the
administration of justice. According to St. Thomas this epikeid constitutes a
form of justice 4 which is not superior to justice in general, but in some respects
superior to strict "common law justice." The strict law cannot do justice to
every concrete individual case. The law-giver in framing laws attends to what
commonly happens; but if these laws were to be applied to certain cases, they
would actually frustrate the idea of justice and equality and thus be injurious
to the common good which the law has in view. "In these and like cases it is
bad to follow the strict law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the strict
law and follow the dictates of justice and the common good." 5 For "to follow
6
Epikeia,
the letter of the strict law when it should not be followed is sinful."
on the other band, does not set aside what is right and just, nor does it try to
pass judgment on the strict law by claiming that the latter was not well made.
It merely insists that, in the interest of a truly effective and fair administration
of justice, the strict law is not to be applied in some particular instance. For
"without doubt he transgresses the law who by adhering to the letter of the
strict law strives to defeat the intention of the law-giver," 7 and thus obstructs
the achievement of the common good, the ultimate end of all law. According
to St. Thomas the administration of justice should, in its effort to bridge the
ever present lack of formal sources of the positive law or to bridge the gaps in
these sources, take into account the inspirations of reason and of conscience before
coming down to an examination of the positive nature of things. For there are
principles of justice which are superior to the contingencies of fact as well as to
the contingencies of the strict law. And these principles are to be applied through
epikeia.
The basic views of St. Thomas on epikeia are under the influence of Aristotle
who had stated that the strict law always contains "a general statement 8 which
lays down a general rule 9 and which for that very reason cannot cover every
particular case, 1 0 but must in certain instances be considered defective on account
of its generality." 11 In addition, the law-givers often "find -themselves unable to
define things accurately." 12 "In matters, therefore, where, while it is necessary
to speak in general terms, it is not possible to do so correctly, the strict law
takes into consideration merely the majority of cases, although it is not unaware
of the error this involves." 13 But, "the materials of human conduct are essenS.THEOL. I. II. qu. 96, art. 1.
3 Id. art. 6.
4 S. THEOL. II. II. qu. 120, art. 1 and art. 6.
5 Id. art. 1 and art. 2.
2

6
7

Ibid.
Ibid.

8 Nic. ETH. 1137 b 12 ff.; 1137 b 20; 1137 b 27.
9 Id. 1137 b 20 ff.
10 Id. 1137 h 14.
11 Id. 1137 b 26.
12 RHETORIc 1374 a 30.
13 Nic. ETH. 1137 b 14 ff.
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tially irregular." 14 Thus in the sphere of human conduct situations may arise
which, for justice's sake, have to be considered exceptions to the general rules
laid down by the strict law.1 5 In other words, instances may occur where it is
necessary to decide on general terms, but nevertheless impossible to apply an
universally valid rule of law.' 0 This exception to the general or universally valid
rule of the strict law is the Aristotelean epieikeia or "equity," which is actually
nothing else than a "rectification of the strict law wherever the latter proves
itself defective on account of its generality." 17 "When the strict law lays down
a general rule and thereafter a case arises which is not covered by this general
rule, then it is right and just, where the law-giver fails us and has erred through
over-simplification, to correct this omission or defect by deciding as the law-giver
himself would decide if he were present on the occasion, and would have legislated if he had been cognizant of the case in question." 18 Epieikeia is, therefore,
an "indefinite standard" made to fit the circumstances of a particular case in itself
indefinite as regards the strict law.L9 But it must always conform to the general
principles of justice. Epieikeia thus distinguishes itself from the general rules of
the strict law by the absence of universal applicability. 2 0 But in no way is
2
epieikeia intended to break down the authority of the strict law. '
On page 82 the author seems to be a little troubled over the passage "aequitas
vero (potest contineri) sub epikeia vel amicitfa." 22 We remember that in Nic.
Eth. 1134 ff. Aristotle speaks of the equitable and fair man 23 "who by choice
and habit does what is equitable and fair, and who does not stand on his rights
unduly, but is content to receive a smaller share, although he has the law on
his side." St. Thomas refers to this passage in his Commentary to Aristotle's
Ethics,24 but fails to see that Aristotle speaks here of the "fair minded individual"
and not, as St. Thomas implies, of the courts which act leniently toward some one
who has transgressed the law. Obviously, this Aristotelean "equitable man" is not
identical with epieikeia discussed in the preceding paragraph. There can be little
doubt that this new type of epieikeia is no longer related to the traditional
Aristotelean meaning of justice, but signifies "unselfish devotion to the well being
of another, the Aristotelean philia.25 Philia can be translated as amitia or
"friendship," although the term "friendship" does not actually render the full
meaning of Aristotle's philia. Philia (amicitia) actually signifies a sympathetic
attitude towards another, a sense of socio-moral responsibility and sociabilitythe fullest realization of human relations and human values accomplished in the
spirit of unselfish service to others. Hence the highest perfection of justice is to
be found in the philia or amicitia, the practice of unselfish devotion to one's
fellow man. "If men were friends," that is, altogether dedicated to the ideal of
unselfish mutual devotion, "then there is no need of legal justice among them." 26
Id. 1137
15 Id. 1137
10 Id. 1137
17 Id. 1137
18 Id. 1137
14

b 19.
b 20 ff.
b 14-if.
b 26 ff.
b 19 ff.

19 Id. 1137 b 26 ff.
PouriTcs 1292 a 38.
21 Nrc. Em. 1137 b 24 ff.
22 S. TBiEoL. 31 qu. 80, art. unic.
23 Nc. ETm. 1135 a 35; 1137 a 34 ff.
24 V. lect. 16.
25 Nzc. ET. 1155 a1I f.
26 Id. 1155 a 28.
20
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For whoever has this phi/ia or amidtia, and whoever practices this type of
epicikea does not merely regard his fellow man as his equal in a legalistic sense,
but enters with him into an ideal social union, into "a friendship between man
and man universally." 27
Anton-Hernann Chroust*

EDUCAT.ON OR PRomsisoiAL R.SPoNsiBLrry. Proceedings of the Inter-Professions Conference on Education for Professional Responsibility. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1948. 207 pages.-This book is a report of the Inter-Profession Conference held at Buck Hill Falls, Pa., April 12-14, 1948. The various sections are
written by representatives from seven universities, two institutes of technology,
one theological seminary, the Director of the General Education Board and the
Executive Director, Institute of Pastoral Care, Massachusetts General Hospital.
The nineteen sections of the book in addition to dealing with the three traditional
professions, medicine, ministry and law, include also two modern professions,
engineering and business.

Following the introduction by Elliott Dunlap Smith of the Carnegie Institute
of Technology, Chairman of the Conference, Session I, "The Objectives of Professional Education" presents addresses on all the professions named above except
medicine; Session II. "Content and Method in Professional Education" treats
of all five professions with two addresses dealing with medicine; and Session
III. "Social and Humanistic Aspects of Professional Education" deals with the
three traditional professions only, with the last address "The Education of
Professional Students for Citizenship" by Dr. Smith again (also Chairman of the
Planning Committee) dealing with the problem of integrating general and professional education from two points of view of content and method (pp. 188-203).
This address discusses the problem of separate and subsequent education in the
two areas in contrast with education in both at the same time; that is, as Dr.
Smith expresses it, "in parallel." He strongly favors the latter solution for this
problem.
The readers of this review will be more interested in the address entitled
"What the Law School Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers'l by Lon L.
Fuller of Harvard University (pp. 14-35). He lists four objectives of legal education: (1) to give the student knowledge, (2) to impart skils, (3) to expose the
student to great minds, and (4) "to give the student an understanding of, and
an insight into the processes in which the lawyer participates." After suggesting
that "specific knowledge and specific skills are relatively unimportant," he makes
a strong plea for the fourth conception, "The lawyer is a participant, and usually
the most active and responsible participant, in two basic social processes: adjudication and legislation. Both terms are here used in a somewhat broader sense
than is customary" (p. 18). He then analyzes each process in some detail. On
the basis of this analysis he answers the question, "What branches of law should
we include in the three-year course?" (p. 23). The address is concluded with
an answer to this question: "How can we relate law to the life and theory beyond
law without losing the sharp focus on specific issues that has been a cardinal
virtue of traditional legal education?" (p. 28). Certainly this address merits
rd. 1155 a 22.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
27
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careful reading and study by all professors of law and in some cases surely,
replanning the curriculum for the improvement of legal education in the schools
in which they are serving.
There are brief bibliographies on four of the professions treated (pp. 205-7)
but none on the ministry. There is no index.
W. F. Cunningham, C.S.C.*

CoNsERvATIoN or Om. AND GAs. A LEGAL HIsTORY, 1948. Edited by Blakely
M. Murphy.' Chicago: Section of Mineral Law, American Bar Association. 1949.
754 pages. $3.00.-The introduction to this work characterizes it as "neither a
2
textbook nor a technical treatise of the regulation of oil and gas production".
This is a correct description. The book is, however, a valuable collection of
monographs by experts in the field of conservation law assisted by experienced
technical advisers. In 1938, the Section of Mineral Law of The American Bar
Association which is responsible for the publication of the present volume published a similar work on the subject. 3 This preceding book contained a brief
discussion of the theory and practical application of statutes for the conservation
of oil and gas, and described the conservation record in nine states. The present
volume is much more complete. It contains the conservation record of thirty-five
states and also describes the conservation activities of the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission and the national government.

The present volume is organized into four parts. Part I is concerned with the
nature of petroleum reserves, reservoir fluids, and reservoir energies. Part II
deals with the legislative, judicial, and administrative background in the various
states. Part III with the Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas and the
Compact Commission, and Part IV describes the federal conservation functions.
The first part of the book which deals with the technological background of
conservation comprises only a few pages of the volume (pages 3-15). The brief
treatment of the subject, however, is excellent. It is written in nontechnical
language and is devoid of the usually present (and sometimes confusing) diagrams and drawings. One does not need engineering training to understand the
technical fundamentals of oil and gas reservoirs as outlined in this short section.
Pages 19 to 541, inclusive, almost three-fourths of the book, are concerned
with conservation concepts as applied within the jurisdiction of the states. These
summaries of the oil and gas producing states could not be properly termed
analytical studies, but they give adequate descriptions of the legislative histories
of state conservation and note the leading judicial and administrative holdings in
matters of conservation. The editors and writers of the book have shown judiciousness in that they have devoted more space and study to the important oil and
gas producing states. Thus, only four pages (19-22) are deemed sufficient to
describe the legislative history of conservation in Alabama while nearly sixty-five
pages (447-512) are needed to record the conservation legislation of Texas,
"Alabama," the editors note, "is a newcomer to the roll of states having wells
*Professor of Education, University of Notre Dame.
1 Editor and Member of the Committee on Special Publications, Section of
Mineral Law, American Bar Association.
2 p. xv.
3 LEGA HISTORY An CONSERVATION " O OIL AND GAs-A Smzaosrum (1938).
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producing commercial quantities of oil and gas."
an "oldtimer" in oil and gas production.

4

On the other hand, Texas is

In making these state conservation studies, the writers of the present volume
have given consideration to the development and role of proration, well-spacing,
and unit operation. 5 These techniques for oil and gas conservation have been
developed to combat economic over-expansion and creation of waste. It is
assumed by the proponents of these measures that production in excess of market
demand is waste. It is important to have a record of the present status of these
conservation methods, in order to understand the controversial literature on the
subject.6
The portion of the book devoted to the Interstate Oil Compact Commission
is probably one of the best descriptions of the work and objectives of this voluntary, inter-governmental agency of the oil jurisdictions. The workings of this
commission are set down in detail as well as the activities of its constituent committees. The present volume notes that:
The Commission [i.e. Compact Commission] has gone on record as the
sponsor of any and all legitimate programs to preserve by known legal
means and scientific means the reservoir pressures, to increase the ultimate recovery of oil and to prevent its waste, to improve the efficiency
of secondary recovery in all its multitudinous aspects, to recommend and
secure the passage of uniform measures which lead to better utilization
of present knowledge of the physical characteristics of reservoirs, to urge
the adoption of rules, regulations, and orders furthering the statutory
devices, and finally to provide interest, support, and understanding to
those to whom conservation is a true saving of oil and gas by achieving
a maximum economic recovery.7
The labors of this agency justify the saying of "Amen" to this statement.
The last part of the book discusses the activities of the National Government in the field of conservation. The reading of this section of the book leaves
the reader with the feeling that the authors have already decided that local
(i.e. state) law supplemented by the Interstate Compact and supported by the
Federal Hot Oil Act constitutes a system of regulation and administration best
designed to prevent waste and to serve the public interest. It is of interest in
this connection to note an excerpt from the Smith-Wimberly Report on the
Natural Gas Investigation undertaken by the Federal Power Commission. It
reads in part, as follows:
It is highly desirable that these problems of conservation and the protection of correlative property rights be dealt with locally by those who
4 p. 19.
5 Proration-Proration is a method of waste reduction through production
control. It involves assigning to each well a fixed daily quantity of production
known as the per-well allowable.
Well Spacing-To prevent indiscriminate drilling of wells, it is provided that
no well shall be drilled unless it is to be the only well within a given area
(usually 10 to 40 acres for oil wells).
Unit Operation-In unit operation, all surface lessees over a given reservoir
agree to treat their properties as a single lease, the project being carried out by
a single operator responsible to a committee on which all lessees have representation.
6 See, Comment, Prorationof Petroleum Production, 51 YALE L. J. 608 (1942)
and 6 INTE.RSTATE OIL COMPACT QUARTERLY BuLLETiN, No. 2, p. 60 (Aug. 1947).
7 pp. 595-596.
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are in close touch with the particular conditions and varied requirements
of changing local situations.
But it is just as important to recognize that the authority of the
States within this sphere is not merely a right; it likewise confers a
responsibility which the States must effectively meet and which they can
fulfill, with the necessary cooperation from the oil and gas industries,
"if they only will." 8
No review of the present volume would be complete without mentioning
certain features of the book that make it useful as a reference work. First, every
chapter of the book is fully annotated with citations to cases, administrative
orders, rules and documents, law articles, and textbooks, as well as sundry other
materials pertaining to conservation. Appendix A consists of a table of state
conservation agencies, their personnel and location. Appendix B is a listing of
the writers (with biographical sketches) of the monographs that comprise the
book and their advisers. Appendix C contains the text of the Interstate Compact
to Conserve Oil and Gas, and Appendix D gives the By-laws of the Interstate
Compact Commission.
One last characteristic of the book deserves real praise. Even a non-technical
discussion of a technical subject is prone to be dull. This volume is an exception; in fact, it is most readable. The authors do not have qualms about originating apt words such as "lawgineers" and "enginawyers."9 Nor do they fear to
begin a chapter on the development of conservation legislation in Oklahoma by
writing:
The King is dead. Long live the King. A new ruler has come to the
throne in the last ten years. Not by one blow, but by a series of thrusts
and jabs, the legislature, the courts and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission have buried individual (I own) property rights, and raised to
the throne the greatest good for the greatest number.lO
This reviewer is happy to report that the editor and writers of this book have
succeeded in making the volume very interesting reading without sacrificing the
high quality of its contents.
Louis Charles Kaplan*

THE JUDILAL FUNCTION AND INDUSnim AND INTEnATIONAL DISPuTES. By
Robert N. Wilkin.1 Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1948. 91 pages. $2.75.Judge Robert N. Wilkin of the United States District Court in Cleveland was
invited by his alma mater, the University of Virginia, to deliver a series of lectures
under the sponsorship of the William H. White Foundation. These lectures, three
in number, were delivered in 1948 and are now published in book form.
As a prelude to his suggestion that the settlement of labor-management problems and international disputes should be referred to independent courts, judge
Wilkin outlines the history of the judicial function. He starts with ancient times

8 FEmAnL PowEa ComssioN-NATtuAL GAs INsTIGATiON (1948). (Docket
No. G-580)-Sm=-WImFrxLY REPORT, p. 151.
9 p. 422.
10, p. 369.
*Attorney, Bureau of Law, Federal Power Commission, Washington, D. C.
1

United States District judge, Northern District of Ohio.
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and shows that the judicial process has always been recognized as an essential
function of government; that is, the orderly determination of disputes has been
deemed necessary to enable the state to preserve the peace and promote the
common welfare. On the other hand, he emphasizes the fact that the judicial
process has not always been considered a separate function of the state and that
until comparatively modem times, it was often combined with the legislative or
executive branches of government.

After a brief but illuminating resume of the history of the judicial process
in ancient Rome and Greece and in Europe during the Dark Ages, the author

traces its development in England and the United States. While the common law
was slowly developing, two significant ideas relative to the judicial process were
formulated and engrafted upon the Anglo-American jurisprudence. These are
the doctrines of the supremacy of the law and the separation of the judicial
process from the other functions of government. Today, we consider it fundamental that the state itself should be limited by law and that the courts must
be independent of the other branches of government, free to protect the weak
from the strong and to safeguard the rights of all.
Judge Wilkin starts his first lecture by saying, "The history of the world has
been told largely in terms of dynasties and military campaigns, but the rights
and liberties of man have been forged and molded by the judicial process." He
concludes by quoting Professor McIlwain: "And the one institution above all
others essential to preservation of the law has always been and still is an honest,
able, learned, independent judiciary."
Against this historical background of the judicial function, Judge Wilkin
advances the theses that industrial disputes should be subjected to legal determination by regularly constituted courts and that international controversies
should be resolved in a similar manner. He recognizes the formidable obstacles
that are involved, but argues persuasively that these obstacles are surmountable.
The alternative, he says, is anarchy, with its attendant calamitous effects. On
the international level, wars are well-nigh inevitable unless the disputes which
lead to them can be resolved in an orderly way by the judicial process. And on
the domestic scene, economic strife and industrial violence are likely to continue
until the controversial issues between labor and management are recognized as being
within the competence of the courts. In this connection Judge Wilkin states:
We have suffered international anarchy abroad because no world
agency has been created with authority to exercise the sovereignty of law.
And we suffer economic anarchy at home because the governmental
agencies which have been created have failed to exercise the sovereignty
of law in that field.

Judge Wilkin makes specific proposals regarding the settlement of industrial
disputes. He thinks labor problems should not be dealt with by special governmental agencies or labor courts, but that they should be disposed of by regular

judicial procedure. He further says:
The exercise of the judicial function can make a much greater contribution to industrial peace and prosperity than men generally expect.
The history of its evolution, if properly understood, invites a greater
reliance in its processes than men have yet shown a willingness to bestow.
The great obstacle to the exercise of the judicial function in international
affairs is the maintenance of the idea of national sovereignty. Judge Wilkin
writes: "National sovereignty . . . is in the last analysis nothing more than the
power to make war." Therefore, he says, "Claims to sovereignty in world affairs
must be abandoned or modified so as to permit the organization of an adequate
government for world affairs."
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These lectures present a stimulating view and a hopeful aspect of some of
the most perplexing problems which we face today. Some readers may feel that
the distinguished jurist is too idealistic in his approach to solutions of these
problems. But the answer to such criticism, if any there be, is that until his
proposals are tried, who is to say that they will not work. As Judge Wilkin
points out in his concluding remarks, wherever the judicial process has been
employed, it has worked well. He adds that what is needed is faith in the belief
that if it were tried in these suggested areas, it would prove equally adequate.
Luther M. Swygert *

* United States District Judge, Northern District of Indiana.

